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NOTE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LIMITS ON
PROSECUTORIAL APPEAL OF
SENTENCES
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that
no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense.' The
courts have experienced considerable confusion in applying this clause
to criminal proceedings, partly because of the variety of situations that
may raise double jeopardy questions. The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the double jeopardy clause protects defendants not only
from prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, but also from
a second prosecution after a conviction and from multiple punishments
for a single offense.2
In 1970 Congress enacted the Dangerous Special Offender Sen-
tencing Statutes,3 which for the first time empowered appellate courts
to hear appeals by government prosecutors seeking increases in the
sentences imposed by trial courts.4 This statute raised the question
whether appellate review of sentences violates the double jeopardy
clause's prohibition of multiple punishments.5 In United States v.
DiFrancesco,6 the first case in which the United States petitioned for
appellate review of a sentence under the Act, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found that the provisions of the statute providing
for prosecutorial appeal were unconstitutional7 under the double jeop-
I. "[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). See also Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 263-66 (1965).
. 3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1976). For a discussion of the statutes see notes 14-16 infra and
text accompanying notes 13-16 infra.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). Government appeal power also exists under 21 U.S.C. § 849(h)
(1976), which deals with dangerous special drug offenders. Legislation currently pending in Con-
gress would permit appellate review, at the government's behest, of sentences that are not within
specified guidelines. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3225(b) (1979).
5. The few states that have permitted appellate courts to increase sentences have done so
only when the defendant sought review. No state statute presently authorizes the government to
seek an increase in a valid original sentence. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1979); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1801A09 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194 to -197 (West 1960); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 5, §§ 2141-2144 (1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA-645JG (1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 278 §§ 28A-28D (West 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2501 to -2504
(1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651:57-:61 (1979).
6. 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-567).
7. The court of appeals implied that state statutory provisions providing for appeal by the
defendant are constitutional because the defendant voluntarily chooses to seek review. 604 F.2d
at 786.
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ardy clause. The court based its decision on the hostility of the double
jeopardy clause both to government appeals in criminal cases and to
multiple punishment through increasing sentences.8 This Note will ex-
amine the constitutionality of appellate court review of sentences in
light of the double jeopardy clause's limitations on government appeals
and prohibition of multiple punishments. The Note will conclude that
the double jeopardy clause is not always hostile to government appeals
and that Congress may provide for a sentencing process that includes
appellate review without transgressing the limits imposed by the double
jeopardy clause's multiple punishment doctrine.
I. UNITED STATES V. DIFRANCESCO
In United States v. DiFrancesco the government petitioned the
court of appeals for review of the sentence of a dangerous special of-
fender,9 pursuant to section 3576 of the Criminal Code.10 This provi-
8. Id. at 782, 785-87.
9. Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted of racketeering and bombing in two separate jury
trials. Prior to his trial on the racketeering charges the government filed a notice with the district
court alleging that DiFrancesco was a dangerous special offender as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e)(3) and (f) (1976). The notice indicated that the government intended to seek imposition
of an enhanced sentence under section 3575(b) in the event DiFrancesco was convicted. Pursuant
to section 3575(b), see note 13 infra, the district court held a special sentencing hearing at which it
ruled that DiFrancesco was a dangerous special offender. The court sentenced DiFrancesco to
concurrent terms of 10 years' imprisonment for the racketeering charges, to be served concurrently
with the nine-year sentence imposed in connection with his second trial and conviction for bomb-
ing. 604 F.2d at 780. Under the authority granted by 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976), the government
appealed the sentence. DiFrancesco appealed from both convictions, but did not seek review of
the sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. 604 F.2d at 773-79.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) provides:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a sentence after proceed-
ings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the record of the
sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or the United States to a court of ap-
peals. Any review of the sentence taken by the United States shall be taken at least five
days before expiration of the time for taking a review of the sentence or appeal of the
conviction by the defendant and shall be diligently prosecuted. The sentencing court
may, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for taking a review of the
sentence for a period not to exceed thirty days from the expiration of the time otherwise
prescribed by law. The court shall not extend the time for taking a review of the sen-
tence by the United States after the time has expired. A court extending the time for
taking a review of the sentence by the United States shall extend the time for taking a
review of the sentence or appeal of the conviction by the defendant for the same period.
The taking of a review of the sentence by the United States shall be deemed the taking of
a review of the sentence and an appeal of the conviction by the defendant. Review of the
sentence shall include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the find-
ings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. The
court of appeals on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including
the entire presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and
the sentencing hearing, and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the
sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court
could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and impo-
sition of sentence, except that a sentence may be made more severe only on review of the
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sion is part of the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Statutes,"
which were enacted to remove unwarranted disparities in sentences and
to promote equal treatment of similarly situated offenders. 12 Section
3576 provides that the sentences of felons designated as dangerous of-
fenders' 3 may be reviewed in the courts of appeals upon a motion by
either the defendant or the United States.' 4 The statute provides that
when the United States seeks review of a sentence, the court of appeals
must automatically review the sentence and the conviction on behalf of
the defendant.' 5 The appellate court must determine whether the sen-
tencing court employed a lawful procedure, whether its findings were
clearly erroneous, and whether it abused its discretion. After consider-
ing the record, including the entire pre-sentence report, information
submitted during the trial and sentence hearing, and the findings of the
sentencing court, the court of appeals may affirm the sentence, impose
any sentence that the sentencing court could have originally imposed,
or remand to the trial court for further sentencing proceedings. 16 The
severity of the sentence can be increased only if the United States is the
party seeking review.
The court of appeals in DiFrancesco dismissed the government's
petition for review of the sentence on the ground that the portion of
sentence taken by the United States and after hearing. Failure of the United States to
take a review of the imposition of the sentence shall, upon review taken by the United
States of the correction or reduction of the sentence, foreclose imposition of a sentence
more severe than that previously imposed. Any withdrawal or dismissal of review of the
sentence taken by the United States shall foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe
than that reviewed but shall not otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence or the
appeal of the conviction. The court of appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its
disposition of the review of the sentence. Any review of the sentence taken by the
United States may be dismissed on a showing of abuse of the right of the United States
to take such review.
.11. Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1976).
12. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT
317 (1971).
13. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976), the district court holds a special sentencing hearing to
determine if the defendant is a dangerous special offender. The statute provides in part:
Upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty of the
defendant of such felony, a hearing shall be held before sentence is imposed, by the court
sitting without a jury. . . . If it appears by a preponderance of the information, includ-
ing information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and
so much of the presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dan-
gerous special offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an
appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to
the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony. Otherwise it shall sen-
tence the defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony.
The court shall place in the record its findings, including an identification of the infor-
mation relied upon in making such findings, and its reasons for the sentence imposed.
14. If the United States seeks review of the sentence, it must appeal at least five days before
expiration of the time in which the defendant may seek a review of his sentence or conviction. 18
U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
15. Id.
16. The court of appeals must state the reasons for its disposition of the appeal in writing. Id.
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section 3576 authorizing the government's appeal violated the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.' 7 The court analyzed two spe-
cific issues. First it considered whether the double jeopardy clause pro-
tects a defendant from sentence review when he has not voluntarily
submitted to such review. The court observed that government appeals
to obtain an increase in a valid, enforceable sentence were unknown to
the American legal system throughout most of the nation's history.18 In
the few states in which appellate courts have the power to increase a
sentence, they can exercise that power only when the defendant initi-
ates the appellate proceeding by seeking review of the sentence. 19
In light of this history, the Second Circuit believed it should scruti-
nize the statute with suspicion. Hence, the court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the initial sentence was merely "tentative,"20 on
the ground that "appeals by the Government in criminal cases are
something unusual, exceptional, not favored, at least in part because
they always threaten to offend the policies behind the double jeopardy
prohibition.' t The court later re-emphasized the apparent conflict be-
17. In a concurring opinion, Judge Haight argued that the government's appeal should have
been dismissed because sections 3575 and 3576 did not apply to the defendant. 604 F.2d at 787-89
(Haight, J., concurring). He considered section 3575(b) inapplicable because it provides for a
maximum term of twenty-five years' imprisonment, but DiFrancesco was already subject to a total
sentence of forty years, consisting of consecutive twenty-year terms for each of the two counts for
which he was convicted. 604 F.2d at 787-89 (Haight, J., concurring). Section 3575(b) is set out in
part in note 13 supra. Judge Haight concluded that the inapplicability of section 3575(b) made
section 3576 inapplicable as well. The majority of the court disagreed, concluding that section
3575 applies to the particular felony in question, not an aggregate of all felonies for which the
defendant may have been convicted. 604 F.2d at 780-81 n.13 ("Since the maximum sentence...
for each of DiFrancesco's two felony convictions was less than the twenty-five year term available
under § 3575, the district court properly could find that the statute was applicable").
18. 604 F.2d at 781.
19. For a list of state statutes that provide for appellate review on petition by the defendant,
see note 5 supra. The court of appeals reached no conclusion regarding whether the failure of
states to provide for government review was based on policy reasons or double jeopardy protec-
tions. Congress's failure to provide for appellate review of sentences prior to 1970 apparently was
based on its desire to place the sentencing function in the sole discretion of the trial judge. See
notes 167-170 infra and accompanying text.
20. 604 F.2d at 786-87. A trial court's determination of the finality or immediate effect of a
sentence is not dispositive. Congress determines whether or not a trial court sentence is final. See
notes 167-170 supra and accompanying text.
21. 604 F.2d at 782 (emphasis added) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967)).
Will cited Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957), for the proposition that government
appeals are "something unusual, exceptional, not favored." The Carroll Court stated that the
presumption against government appeals was based on the lack of an express statutory authoriza-
tion for such appeals.
That is the concept that in the federal jurisprudence, at least, appeals by the Government
in criminal cases are something unusual, exceptional, not favored. The history shows
resistance of the Court to the opening of an appellate route for the Government until it
[Vol. 1980:847
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tween double jeopardy and government appeals. The court referred to
North Carolina v. Pearce,22 in which a defendant successfully appealed
his first conviction and received a retrial. The Supreme Court in
Pearce had held that the double jeopardy clause did not prevent impo-
sition of a harsher sentence following the second conviction.2 3 The
Second Circuit distinguished Pearce because DiFrancesco had not cho-
sen voluntarily to subject himself to the risk of an increased sentence,
but faced "jeopardy for a second time" solely because the government
sought to appeal the severity of the trial court's sentence. 24 Thus, while
the Second Circuit did not rely solely on the impermissibility of gov-
ernment appeals, it plainly was influenced by the notion that
DiFrancesco was placed in jeopardy for a second time, against his will.
The court then considered whether an increase of a sentence by
congressionally authorized appellate court review violated the double
jeopardy clause. The court reasoned that the defendant's conviction
and sentence in the district court placed him in jeopardy a first time;25
the possibility of an additional penalty as a result of the government's
appeal constituted double jeopardy.2 6 The court compared
DiFrancesco with the defendant in Kepner v. United States,27 in which
a double jeopardy attack succeeded. The defendant in Kepner was ac-
quitted in the first trial, but subsequently was convicted after a govern-
ment appeal. Because the Second Circuit found the cases
indistinguishable in principle, "the conclusion [was] inescapable" that
the government's successful appeal in DiFrancesco violated the double
jeopardy clause.28
was plainly provided by the Congress, and after that a close restriction of its uses to those
authorized by the statute.
Id. at 400. Thus, the original hostility to government appeals was not based on the double jeop-
ardy clause, but on the lack of requisite statutory authorization. The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that Congress removed any statutory barriers to government appeals when it adopted the
Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), in 1970. See notes 42-43 infra and accompanying
text.
In recent cases the Supreme Court has asserted that there is no bar to government appeals
unless they offend the double jeopardy clause. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 85-86
(1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1977); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345-46 (1975). This assertion is an implicit repudiation of the language in
Will that all government appeals offend the double jeopardy clause.
22. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
23. Id. at 719-23.
24. 604 F.2d at 786.
25. Id. at 783.
26. Id.
27. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
28. 604 F.2d at 783. The court observed that Kepner and subsequent cases have rejected
Justice Holmes's "continuing jeopardy" theory, which postulated that "logically and rationally a
man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be
Vol. 1980:847]
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In support of its conclusion, the court reviewed the objectives of
the double jeopardy clause. Emphasizing that the clause protects de-
fendants not merely from a second trial for the same offense, but also
from more than one punishment for a single offense,29 the court as-
serted that an increase in the sentence imposed by the trial court would
constitute multiple punishment. The court reached this conclusion by
relying heavily on dictum in United States v. Benz30 and on statements
by several courts of appeals that a punishment partly served cannot be
increased. 3'
The DiFrancesco decision thus has two themes. The first-the ap-
parent basis for the holding-is that a procedure in which an appellate
court increases the punishment imposed by the trial court violates the
multiple punishment aspect of the double jeopardy clause. This con-
clusion rests on the presumption that the congressional authorization of
prosecutorial appeal of lenient sentences violates double jeopardy lim-
its. The second theme is that the double jeopardy clause is, in the view
of the Second Circuit, hostile to government appeals in criminal cases.
Other decisions on the permissibility of government appeals, though,
indicate that the Second Circuit displayed an unreasonably harsh atti-
tude toward the concept of government appeals. These cases provide
an understanding of the relationship between double jeopardy princi-
ples and government appeals, suggesting a framework for analyzing
whether a particular government appeal violates the double jeopardy
clause.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT APPEALS
The DiFrancesco court, in emphasizing the fact that the case in-
volved a government appeal, intimated that the double jeopardy clause
tried." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), quo/ed in
United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769,783 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 1012 (1980)
(No. 79-567). Justice Holmes had explained:
If a statute should give a right to take exceptions to the Government, I believe it
would be impossible to maintain that the prisoner would be protected by the Constitu-
tion from being tried again. He no more would be put in jeopardy a second time when
retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would be when retried for a
mistake that did him harm.
195 U.S. at 135 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes's theory greatly simplifies the problem of
government appeals. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978).
29. 604 F.2d at 784. The court so held despite the Supreme Court's statements that the un-
derlying principle of the double jeopardy clause "is not against being twice punished, but against
being twice put in jeopardy. . . ," United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896), and despite the
language of the clause itself, which "is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction,
not punishment," Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 532 (1975) (emphasis in original).
30. 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
31. 604 F.2d at 785.
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is hostile to such appeals. Analysis of double jeopardy cases, however,
reveals that government appeals in criminal cases are permissible un-
less the appeal gives rise to practices considered unacceptable under
double jeopardy principles forbidding multiple punishment or multiple
prosecutions. In a line of cases addressing acquittals, convictions, and
midtrial terminations of cases favorable to defendants, the Supreme
Court has articulated principles to be applied to government appeals.
The DiFrancesco court failed to apply these principles to determine
whether appellate court review of sentences is unconstitutional multiple
punishment.
A. The Relationship Between Government Appeals and the Prohibition
Against Multiple Prosecutions.
1. The Government's Right to Appeal. The United States can ap-
peal a criminal case only when Congress has granted it explicit author-
ity to do So. 3 2 At the time of the ratification of the fifth amendment,
most criminal prosecutions proceeded to final judgment, and neither
the United States nor the defendant had any right to appeal.33
In 1802, however, Congress provided for review of some criminal
cases by the Supreme Court, but only upon a certificate of division
from the circuit court, and not at the instigation of the defendant. 34
These requirements were changed in 1889, when Congress enacted leg-
islation permitting criminal defendants in capital cases to seek a writ of
error from the Supreme Court.35 Two years later, Congress extended
the right to appeal to defendants in all federal criminal cases. 36 This
expansion of defendants' rights did not remove the limitation on the
government's right to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the provi-
sions of the Judiciary Act of 189137 were not sufficiently explicit to sat-
isfy the common law rule requiring an express grant by the legislature
before the government could issue a writ of error in a criminal case.3 8
In 1907 Congress passed the first Criminal Appeals Act, which al-
lowed appeals by the government in limited situations.39 The Act per-
mitted the government to appeal from a decision dismissing an
32. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). In the case of dangerous special
offenders the applicable statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
33. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
34. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. XXXI, § 6, 2 Stat. 159.
35. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656.
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318, 322-23 (1892).




indictment or arresting judgment when the decision was based on the
construction of a statute or on a finding that a statute is invalid.40 The
Criminal Appeals Act was amended in 1942 to permit appeals by the
government from decisions granting dismissal or arrest of judgment on
grounds other.than the construction or invalidity of a statute.4'
Congress repealed the 1907 Act in 1970 and replaced it with a new
Criminal Appeals Act.42 The legislative history makes it clear that
Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to government ap-
peals, thereby allowing appeals whenever constitutionally permissi-
ble.43 This change shifted the focus of attention in government appeals
cases from questions of statutory construction to the scope and mean-
ing of the double jeopardy clause.44
2. Double Jeopardy Clause Limitations on Government Appeals.
The double jeopardy clause had its origin in the three common
law pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon.45 These
three pleas prevented the retrial of a person who had been previously
acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the same offense. On the basis of
this common law background, the Supreme Court has concluded that
the "controlling constitutional principle" of the double jeopardy clause
is the prohibition against multiple trials.46 At the heart of this policy is
the concern that permitting the sovereign to subject a citizen to a sec-
ond trial for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
instrument of oppression.47
Cases applying these principles indicate, however, that the double
jeopardy clause does not automatically bar a government appeal after a
40. The Act also permitted the government to appeal from a decision sustaining a special
plea in bar when the defendant had not been put in jeopardy. Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch.
2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
41. Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat. 271. In 1968, the statute was further amended to
authorize prosecutorial appeals from pretrial rulings granting motions to suppress or return seized
property. Title VIII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 237 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
42. Congress enacted the new statute as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1890 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
43. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). For a thorough account of the
enactment and development of the Act, see United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 291-96 (1970).
See generally Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
44. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 85-86 (1978).
45. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-37. As early as the 15th century the English
courts used the term "jeopardy" in connection with the prohibition against multiple trials. See
Kirk, 'eovardy" During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 602, 613 (1934).
46. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346 (1975)). See note 29 supra.
47. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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defendant has been acquitted;48 nor does it automatically prohibit a
second prosecution when the defendant appeals a conviction4 9 or the
government appeals a midtrial termination of a case favorable to the
defendant.50 An examination of the relationship of government ap-
peals to acquittals, convictions, and midtrial termination of cases
reveals that the double jeopardy clause proscribes government appeals
only when there is a danger of government oppression through multi-
ple prosecutions.
(a) Acquittals. The Supreme Court has determined that the
double jeopardy guarantee against multiple prosecutions consists of
three separate constitutional protections. The first is a protection
against a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal.5 '
United States v. Bal52 presented to the Supreme Court, for the first
time, a challenge to a second prosecution after an acquittal. In Ball,
three persons had been tried together for murder; two were convicted,
and the other was acquitted. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions because the indictment was defective.5 3 In a second trial, in
which the defendant originally acquitted was retried along with the de-
fendants originally convicted, all three defendants were convicted. The
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited the sec-
ond prosecution of the formerly acquitted defendant, but that the
clause did not bar the prosecution of those defendants who had been
convicted in the earlier proceeding.5 4 The Court explained that the
fifth amendment did not allow the government to prosecute the defend-
ant after a finder of fact had already ruled in his favor.55
In the 1904 case of Kepner v. United States,56 the Supreme Court
applied the Ball principle to a government appeal. Although statutory
restrictions limited the government's right to appeal prior to 1970,57
Keypner presented an unusual situation. Kepner had been acquitted in
48. See notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 72-88 infra and accompanying text.
50. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
51. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d
1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jacamillo, 510 F.2d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970,
972 (1st Cir. 1971).
52. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
53. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891).
54. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896). See text accompanying notes 71-73
infra-
55. 163 U.S. at 672.
56. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
57. See notes 33-43 supra and accompanying text.
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his original trial in the Philippine Islands, but traditional Philippine
procedure provided for a trial de novo upon appeal.58 The appellate
court convicted Kepner in the trial de novo. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the proceeding in the appellate court was a second
trial on the merits, in violation of the double jeopardy clause prohibi-
tion against placing a person in jeopardy for the same offense after ac-
quittal.5 9 In subsequent cases, the Court has applied Kepner to forbid
retrial of an acquitted defendant.60
The Court next dealt with these issues in Green v. Unted Saes.61
Green had been tried and convicted of first-degree murder after an ap-
pellate court had reversed his earlier conviction of the lesser included
offense of second-degree murder. The Court first rejected the argument
that the defendant's appeal of the second-degree murder conviction op-
erated as a waiver of his plea of former jeopardy with regard to the
charge of first-degree murder. The Court then reversed the conviction
obtained at the retrial, on the ground that the first jury's verdict of
guilty on the second-degree murder charge was an "implicit acquittal"
on the charge of first-degree murder.62 Furthermore, the Court rea-
soned that the defendant had been placed in jeopardy on the greater
charge when the jury in the first trial "was given a full opportunity to
return a verdict" on that charge, even though the jury instead returned
a guilty verdict on the lesser charge.63 The Court described its conclu-
sion as consistent with the purpose underlying the prohibition against
multiple prosecutions:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the An-
glo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at-
58. An act of Congress had expressly made the principles of the double jeopardy clause ap-
plicable to criminal prosecutions in the Philippine Islands, a territory of the United States. 195
U.S. at 133-34.
59. Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the
practice as equivalent to two separate trials. Id. at 133.
60. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 347 n.16 (1975); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919).
61. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
62. Id. at 190.
63. Id. at 191. Similarly, in Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970), the defendant was tried for
murder and convicted of second-degree murder, the lesser included offense. Following a reversal
of the conviction, the defendant was retried for murder and again found guilty of second-degree
murder. The Supreme Court held that the second trial violated the double jeopardy clause, Al-
though the defendant was not convicted of the greater charge on retrial, the Court found that
"[tihe Double Jeopardy Clause. . . is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction,
not the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict." Id. at 331. See also United States v. Barket,
530 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); United States exrel. Rogers v.
La Vallee, 517 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976); United States
v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 1972).
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tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty. 64
The Ball, Kepner, and Green decisions demonstrate that the
double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from a second prosecution
after he has been acquitted by the trier of fact. These cases did not,
however, present the question whether the double jeopardy clause pre-
vents the government from appealing an acquittal when a successful
appeal would not necessitate a second prosecution. This situation
arises when the government appeals an acquittal by a trial judge after
the jury has returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant is not placed in
jeopardy of a second prosecution; he risks only having the trial judge's
acquittal vacated and the jury's guilty verdict reinstated.
The Court addressed this question in United States v. Wilson.65 In
Wilson a jury had entered a verdict of guilty against the defendant for
a federal offense, but the district court dismissed the indictment on the
defendant's post-verdict motion, alleging pre-indictment delay. The
court of appeals determined that the post-verdict dismissal of the in-
dictment was an acquittal and, to avoid double jeopardy, dismissed the
government's appeal. 66 Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court held that the government may, without violating the double
jeopardy clause, appeal from a trial judge's ruling in favor of the de-
fendant after a guilty verdict has been entered by the trier of fact.67
The Court concluded that the double jeopardy clause prohibits govern-
ment appeals after an acquittal only when there is a danger of subject-
ing the defendant to a second trial for the same offense:
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant obvi-
ously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him to con-
tinuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no legitimate claim to
benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected with-
out subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact.68
Because reversal of the trial judge's post-verdict action would merely
reinstate the jury verdict and would not grant the prosecution a new
64. 355 U.S. at 187-88.
65. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). See also United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Burnette, 524 F.2d 29-30 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 939 (1976).
66. 492 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1973).
67. 420 U.S. at 352-53. The Court found that because there was no danger of subjecting the
defendant to a second trial, any controversy respecting whether the trial court's order was an
actual acquittal or simply a dismissal of the indictment was irrelevant in determining protections
afforded by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 336.
68. Id. at 345.
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trial or subject the defendant to multiple prosecution, the government's
appeal in Wilson did not violate the double jeopardy clause. 69
In sum, the double jeopardy clause's protection against multiple
prosecutions does not automatically prevent the government from ap-
pealing an acquittal. An appeal is impermissible only when it threatens
the defendant with a second prosecution.70
(b) Convictions. Along with determining that the double jeopardy
clause precludes further prosecution of a defendant who has been ac-
quitted at the o.iginal trial, United States v. Ball7t established that the
clause does not prohibit a second trial following a defendant's success-
ful appeal of a conviction.72 Referring to the two defendants formerly
found guilty, the Court stated:
Their plea of former conviction cannot be sustained, because
upon a writ of error sued out by themselves the judgment and sen-
tence against them were reversed, and the indictment ordered to be
dismissed .... [I]t is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a
judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be
tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment
for the same offense of which he had been convicted. 73
Supreme Court decisions after Ball lacked consistency and clarity
regarding what circumstances, other than reversal of a conviction be-
cause of a faulty indictment, would permit the retrial of a defendant
who successfully appealed his conviction.7 4 Much of the conceptual
69. [Wlhere there is no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions,
the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended . . . . Since reversal on appeal would
merely reinstate the jury's verdict, review of such an order does not offend the policy
against multiple prosecution.
Id. at 344-45.
70. The Court applied this principle in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564 (1977). It held that the double jeopardy clause barred an appeal by the government from a
trial judge's judgment of acquittal after a deadlocked jury was discharged. The Court recognized
that the "controlling constitutional principle" of the double jeopardy clause focuses on prohibi-
tions against multiple trials, and "where a government appeal presents no threat of successive
prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended." Id. at 569-70. In Marlin Linen Suply
a second prosecution would have been required had the government's appeal been successful;
accordingly, the government appeal was barred.
71. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
72. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 89 (1978). The Court, referring to Ball, stated:
"In the very first case presenting the issues [of challenging verdicts on appeal], the Court estab-
lished principles that have been adhered to ever since." Id. at 88.
73. 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896) (citations omitted).
74. See Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 (1960) (where a conviction was reversed
because of trial error, the double jeopardy clause did not prevent a new trial); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 328 (1957) (implying that appellate courts have authority to order a new trial
as a remedy for evidentiary insufficiency, even when the defendant has moved only for a judg-
ment of acquittal); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (a defendant whose conviction was
reversed because of insufficient evidence could not be retried); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S.
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confusion in this area of the law was caused by the Court's failure to
distinguish between reversals due to trial errors and those resulting
from evidentiary insufficiency.75 Further confusion arose when the
Court attempted to distinguish between defendants seeking only a
judgment of acquittal and those seeking either a judgment of acquittal
or a new trial.7 6
The Supreme Court recently resolved these issues in Burks v.
United States.77 In Burks the jury rejected the defendant's insanity de-
fense and found him guilty of bank robbery. The defendant moved for
a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, holding that the government had failed to
rebut the defendant's proof of insanity, reversed and remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether a directed verdict of acquittal
should be entered or a new trial ordered.78 The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and remanded the case, finding that because
the double jeopardy clause "precludes a second trial once the reviewing
court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only 'just' remedy
available for the court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal. '79
The Burks Court distinguished a reversal for trial error from a
reversal for evidentiary insufficiency. It justified the use of a retrial to
correct trial error by explaining, "[i]t would be a high price indeed for
society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error on the pro-
ceedings leading to conviction."' 0 Because a reversal for trial error
does not indicate that the government failed to prove its case, the rever-
sal provides no implication that the defendant is innocent. It simply
determines that the defendant was convicted in a defective judicial pro-
ceeding.8 ' Therefore, the Court concluded, the accused has a strong
interest in obtaining a fair adjudication of his guilt free from error, just
as society has a valid interest in insuring that the guilty are punished.82
552 (1950) (where a conviction was reversed because of insufficient evidence, the defendant could
be retried).
75. See cases cited in note 74 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra and cases cited in note 74 supra.
77. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
78. United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
79. 437 U.S. at 18.
80. Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)). See also United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343-44 n.1 1 (1975); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
81. 437 U.S. at 15.
82. Id. (citing Note, Double Jeopardy. A New Trial After Appellate Reversalfor Insufficient
Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 365, 370 (1964)).
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The Court relied strongly on Ball, which also involved trial error (the
failure to dismiss a faulty indictment).83
In contrast, when a conviction has been set aside because of insuf-
ficient evidence, as in Burks, the prosecution has been given a fair op-
portunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble.8 4 The double
jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding. Thus, when an appellate reversal means
the government's case was so lacking that it should not have been sub-
mitted to the jury, the defendant should receive the same double jeop-
ardy protections afforded to a defendant receiving a jury's verdict of
acquittal.85
The Burks decision overruled a line of cases that held that a de-
fendant waives his right to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of evi-
dentiary insufficiency by moving for a new trial.86 The Burks Court
decided that a defendant's voluntary choice to seek a new trial does not
preclude the application of double jeopardy principles.8 7 Reversal of
the defendant's conviction because the evidence was insufficient oper-
ates as an acquittal which bars a second prosecution. Only when the
reversal of a conviction is due to trial error is a defendant subject to a
new trial.88
(c) Midtrial terminations. The issue of the relationship between
double jeopardy protections and government appeals also arises when
a trial is terminated before final judgment is entered. For example, the
trial judge may grant a motion for mistrial or terminate the proceeding
favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to a factual determi-
83. The cases cited as precedent in Ball involved trial error as well. See Hopt v. Utah, 120
U.S. 430 (1887); Commonwealth v. Gould, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 171 (1858) (defendant was tried on
a superseding indictment after the original indictment had been challenged); Regina v. Drury, 175
Eng. Rep. 517 (Q.B. 1849) (improper sentence).
Hopi was the last of four appeals from a murder conviction in the territory of Utah. The first
three convictions were reversed because of trial errors, including improper instruction, Hopt v.
People, 104 U.S. 631 (1881); absence of the accused during a portion of the trial, improper admis-
sion of hearsay evidence, and prejudicial instruction, Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); and
inadequacy of the record because the jury instructions were not recorded, Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S.
488 (1885).
84. 437 U.S. at 16. The Court decided that an appellate court's finding that the evidence was
insufficient is equivalent to a determination that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 16 n.10 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787
n.4 (1946)).
85. 437 U.S. at 16.
86. Id. at 18. See cases cited in note 83 supra.
87. 437 U.S. at 18.
88. See also United States v. Jaramillo, 510 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rothfelder, 474 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
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nation of guilt or innocence. 89 According to the Supreme Court, the
double jeopardy clause does not forbid a new trial when the court de-
clares a mistrial for "manifest necessity," 90 or in the absence of
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching;9' when an indictment is dis-
missed at the defendant's request in circumstances functionally
equivalent to a mistrial;92 or when the defendant requests the dismissal
of an indictment without any submission to the judge or jury of the
question of his guilt.93
Recently, in United States v. Scott,9 4 the Court firmly established
the relevant principles in determining whether a midtrial termination
of a case bars a government appeal. The issue in Scott was whether the
dismissal of an indictment for pre-indictment delay barred an appeal
by the government under the double jeopardy clause. Three terms ear-
lier the Court had held in Jenkins v. United States95 that regardless of
whether an acquittal was on the merits of the prosecution's case, the
government had no right to appeal after jeopardy had attached96 be-
cause "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of
factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have
been required upon reversal and remand. '97 Acknowledging "vastly
increased exposure to the various facets of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, ' 98 the Scott Court overruled Jenkins and held that whin the
89. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
90. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1949). See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying
text.
91. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976).
92. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). See also Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977).
93. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
94. Id.
95. 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
96. The courts have developed the concept of "attachment of jeopardy" in order to define the
point in criminal proceedings at which the prohibitions of the double jeopardy clause can be
invoked. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389-93 (1975). In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches
when the jury is impaneled and sworn in. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). In a nonjury trial jeopardy attaches when the court begins to
hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936); see Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 688 (1949). The defendant is not subjected to jeopardy until he "is 'put to trial before
the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'" Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377, 388 (1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)). See Collins v. Loisel.
262 U.S. 426, 429 (1923); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1908); United States v. Macdon-
ald, 207 U.S. 120, 127 (1907).
97. 420 U.S. at 370.
98. 437 U.S. 82, 86 (1978). The Court explained that it had previously placed an "unwarrant-
edly great emphasis on the defendant's right to have his guilt decided" by the first trier of fact
regardless of whether the defendant himself had been responsible for termination of the trial. Id.
at 87.
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defendant seeks to have the trial terminated without any determination
of his guilt or innocence, the government can appeal.99
After discussing the double jeopardy protections that arise once a
final judgment has been entered,100 the Court considered the protec-
tions that apply to trials terminated prior to final judgment. With re-
gard to mistrials, the Court had previously determined that a trial
judge who declares a mistrial invariably contemplates that a second
trial will take place. '0' Because the contemplations of the judge are not
conclusive on the issue of double jeopardy, the propriety of declaring a
mistrial is determined by balancing "'the valued right of a defendant
to have his trial completed by [a] particular tribunal' . . . against the
public interest. . . that justice [be] meted out to offenders." 0 2 If there
is a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial, or if the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated, the declaration of a mistrial is proper and
a second prosecution is not barred.10 3
Next the Court considered the double jeopardy implications of a
case in which the defendant moves for a mistrial. The Court reaffirmed
previous determinations 104 that a mistrial granted at the defendant's
request ordinarily removes any barrier to a second prosecution. 0 5 The
defendant's motion is regarded as a deliberate election to forego the
right to have the first trier of fact determine his guilt or innocence. The
Court noted the importance of the defendant's retention of primary
control over the course to be followed when there is prosecutorial or
judicial error before a determination of guilt.'0 6 Unless the govern-
99. Despite the principle of stare decisis, the Court "bowled] to the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function." Id. at 101 (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
100. The Court summarized the double jeopardy protections that arise after a final judgment
has been entered:
(I) the appeal of a conviction on grounds other than insufficiency of evidence poses no
bar to further prosecution and (2) a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury
verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict,
may not be appealed when a second prosecution would be necessitated by a reversal.
437 U.S. at 90-91. The Court noted that the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal
because of the risk of government oppression, see Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962)
(even though judgment of acquittal was entered erronously by trial judge, the double jeopardy
clause barred a second trial); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), but that the same risk
of oppression does not exist upon the retrial of an individual who has had his conviction over-
turned on appeal. 437 U.S. at 91.
101. 437 U.S. at 92. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977).
102. 437 U.S. at 92 (quoting Downum v. United States, 322 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)).
103. 437 U.S. at 93 (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194, 194 (1824)).
104. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485
(1971).
105. 437 U.S. at 93.
106. Id. at 93-94. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976).
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ment's actions are intended to provoke a mistrial, thereby subjecting a
defendant to the substantial burdens imposed by successive prosecu-
tions, the double jeopardy clause does not protect a defendant who ob-
tains a mistrial from a second prosecution. 07
After laying this foundation, the Scott Court turned to the rela-
tionship between the double jeopardy clause and a second prosecution
after a defendant has successfully terminated the trial in his favor
before a determination of guilt or innocence. Unlike a declaration of
mistrial, the Court observed, "the granting of a motion such as this...
contemplates that the proceedings will terminate then and there in
favor of the defendant."'' 0 The prosecution must appeal the decision
of the trial court in order to reinstate the proceedings. Moreover, the
Court observed that the underlying purpose of the double jeopardy
clause is to prevent the government, with all of its resources and power,
from making repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense.'0 9 The Court concluded that because there is no government
oppression where the defendant elects to seek termination of the trial
before the issue of guilt is submitted to the jury, the double jeopardy
clause should not bar a subsequent government appeal."i0 The Court
indicated that it was not adopting a doctrine of "waiver" of double
jeopardy, but that the double jeopardy clause simply does not relieve a
defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice." ' I The Court
therefore determined "that Government appeals from midtrial dismis-
sals requested by the defendant would significantly advance the public
interest in assuring that each defendant shall be subject to a just judg-
ment on the merits of his case, without 'enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty.' ,112
B." Double Jeopardy Restrictions on Government Appeals.
As discussed above, a court determining whether the double jeop-
ardy clause protects a defendant from a government appeal must avoid
rejecting altogether the concept of government appeals and instead
107. 437 U.S. at 96.
108. Id. at 94.
109. Id. at 96.
110. Id.
111. The court distinguished the appeal of a conviction from a voluntary choice to terminate a
trial without any finding of guilt or innocence. Id. at 100-101. In the appeal of a conviction, as in
Burks, the appellate court can determine that a criminal defendant lacked criminal culpability.
437 U.S. at 97-98. By contrast, the dismissal of an indictment "represents a legal judgment that a
defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed constitu-
tional violation." Id. at 98-99. In the latter case, an appeal by the government does not offend the
double jeopardy clause. Id.
112. Id. at 101 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)).
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must consider whether the actions of the government oppress the de-
fendant by subjecting him to multiple prosecutions or multiple punish-
ment. 13 This consideration requires a court to focus on the principles
underlying the multiple prosecution and multiple punishment doc-
trines. The rule against multiple prosecutions is based on the principle
that the government "should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal [of a second prosecution,] as
well as enhancing the possibility that though innocent he may be found
guilty.11 4 When the second prosecution of a defendant does not vio-
late this principle, the second prosecution is not barred. Thus, although
the government cannot appeal an acquittal which will require a second
prosecution, it can appeal an acquittal which will reinstate a jury's ver-
dict of guilty; 1 5 and although the government cannot appeal a mistrial
declared by a judge absent a "manifest necessity," it can appeal a mis-
trial declared by a judge in the absence of judicial or prosecutorial
overreaching.' 1 6 In each of the above instances, the court must go be-
yond determining whether a second prosecution will result and ask
whether the practice in question violates the defendant's right to be free
from repeated attempts by the government to convict him.
The Supreme Court has determined that the principle underlying
the prohibition against multiple punishment is that an individual
should not be penalized twice for the same offense.' 17 In United States
v. DiFrancesco118 the court of appeals concluded that the government
could not, consistent with the double jeopardy clause's prohibition of
multiple punishment, seek to increase through the appellate process the
sentence imposed by the trial court. The court reasoned that the
double jeopardy clause reflects disapproval of government appeals, and
that the appeal would subject the defendant to jeopardy in the appel-
late court. This analysis, however, is unsound. The multiple prosecu-
tion cases demonstrate that the double jeopardy clause does not forbid
all government appeals,' t9 and that the clause does not protect the de-
113. As stated in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977), in
reference to the relationship of government appeals to multiple prosecutions (and relevant also to
multiple punishment): "[Wihere a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecu-
tions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended."
114. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See notes 109-10 supra and accom-
panying text.
115. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975). See notes 65-70 supra and accom-
panying text.
116. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
117. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
118. 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-567).
119. The appellate court strongly emphasized that the government's appeal would violate the
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fendant from jeopardy unless oppression is present.' 20 Although the
DiFrancesco court engaged in a cursory discussion of cases prohibiting
a trial court from increasing a sentence after the completion of the sen-
tencing procedure,121 it failed to analyze the quite different question of
whether congressional redefinition of the sentencing procedure to in-
clude appellate review constituted an oppressive multiple punishment
forbidden by the clause. The next section of this Note will address this
issue.
III. GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF SENTENCES AS MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENT
A. Application of the Multiole Punishment Doctrine to Criminal
Proceedings.
Questions concerning the application of the multiple punishment
doctrine 22 arise with respect to each of the doctrine's three principal
areas of protection. First, when a defendant's conduct in a single act or
transaction violates two statutes, may the defendant be punished under
both?' 23 Second, when a statute proscribes designated conduct, can the
defendant's conduct constitute more than one violation of the proscrip-
double jeopardy clause because the defendant had not chosen voluntarily to seek review. 604 F.2d
at 785-86. Voluntary consent would be required, however, only when the government's appeal
otherwise would be barred. See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 113 supra.
121. 604 F.2d at 784-85. See notes 152-57 infra and accompanying text.
122. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,235-36 (1972); Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
At the time the fifth amendment was adopted, imprisonment had only recently emerged as an
alternative to the death penalty, whippings, and confinement in public stocks. See United States
v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978). In most instances the legislature prescribed the period of
incarceration for each crime with specificity. Id. Mandatory sentences, however, soon gave way
in some jurisdictions to schemes permitting the sentencing judge, or jury, to consider aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and to select a sentence within a range defined by the legislature.
Id. at 45-46. See also Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 528, 529 (1958). Although the original purpose of incarceration had been retribution and
punishment, see S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 132-33 (2d ed. 1973), rehabilitation
later became an additional element, making the system of punishment more flexible. Id. See also
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), in which Justice Black observed that the "prevalent
modem philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime," and that, accordingly, sentences should be determined with an eye toward the
"[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders." Id. at 247-48.
Today the length of a federal prisoner's confinement is determined initially by the sentencing
judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally prescribed range. Tie United
States Parole Board may, as a general rule, conditionally release a prisoner at any time after he
serves one-third of the judicially fixed term. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).
123. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-
86 (1975); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United States v. Jackson, 482
F.2d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974); Henley v. United States, 433
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tion?124 Third, does a court's increasing a validly imposed sentence or
superimposing a new sentence upon one already served constitute
double punishment? 25 In the above instances, the double jeopardy
guarantee against multiple punishment serves primarily as a restraint
on prosecutors and the courts, 126 who determine the charges to be
brought and the sentences to be imposed. In effect, the clause serves
principally to ensure that neither the courts nor the prosecutors subject
defendants to a greater punishment than the legislature has author-
ized. 127
The application of the double jeopardy clause to these situations is
consistent with the goal of preventing individuals from being punished
twice for the same offense. When a defendant is prosecuted for two
separate offenses arising from the same act or transaction, courts apply
a test 28 which asks whether each offense "requires proof of an addi-
tional fact which the other does not."' 29 Substantial overlapping of the
proof offered to establish the crime satisfies the test so long as each
crime requires an additional element.' 30 If the offenses are the same
under this test, however, consecutive sentences at a single trial are
barred. 13'
The second context in which the multiple punishment doctrine
arises illustrates that Congress has great latitude under the double jeop-
ardy clause to define crimes and establish sentences. 3 2 Courts are
guided by congressional intent in determining whether numerous viola-
F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Minchew, 417 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1969), cerl.
denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970).
124. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952); United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 126-27 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
125. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); Exparle Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 175-78 (1873); United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954); cf. Robinson v. Warden,
Md. House of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1972) (multiple punishment could not
arise until the original sentence had been completely served).
126. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
127. Id.
128. The test, known as the Biockburger test, was adopted by the Supreme Court in Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
129. Id. at 304. See also Brown v. United States, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
130. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
131. See note 126 supra. For example, "selling liquor on a Sunday might warrant two punish-
ments for violating a prohibition law and a blue law, but feloniously entering a bank and robbing
a bank, though violative of two statutes, might warrant but a single punishment." Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 394 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
132. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 665 (1974); see Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).
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tions of a single statute are multiple offenses. 133 There is no violation
of the rule against multiple punishment if Congress has provided for
cumulative punishment for multiple violations of a statute.' 34 A de-
fendant can be punished for only one offense, however, when Congress
does not provide for cumulative punishment, or if the intent of Con-
gress is unclear.' 35 In Bell v. United States136 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question whether the simultaneous transportation of two
women in interstate commerce constituted two offenses under the
Mann Act.
Once more it becomes necessary to determine 'What Congress
has made the allowable unit of prosecution' . . . under a statute
which does not explicitly give the answer. . . .The punishment ap-
propriate for the diverse federal offenses is a matter for the discretion
of Congress, subject only to constitutional limitations, more particu-
larly the Eighth Amendment. Congress could no doubt make the
simultaneous transportation of more than one woman in violation of
the Mann Act liable to cumulative punishment for each woman so
transported. The question is: did it do so?137
The Court concluded that Congress had not expressed a clear intent to
authorize cumulative punishment under the Mann Act, and that absent
a clear expression, "doubt will be resolved against turning a single
transaction into multiple offenses.'138
The third goal of the multiple punishment doctrine is to prevent
the courts from increasing a sentence after the sentencing procedure for
a defendant has been concluded. The Supreme Court established in Ex
Parte Lange 139 that a court may not add a new sentence to one already
completed. In Lange the defendant had been fined, one of the alterna-
tive penalties prescribed by a statute. The Court found that the double
jeopardy clause protected him from the subsequent imposition of a
prison sentence.140 The Supreme Court has subsequently indicated in
dictum,' 41 and a majority of lower courts have held, 142 that increasing a
133. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82-83 (1955).
134. Id.
135. See cases cited in note 124 supra.
136. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
137. Id. at 81-83 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221
(1952)).
138. 349 U.S. at 84.
139. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 175-78 (1874).
140. Id. See text accompanying notes 155-56 infira.
141. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931). See notes 152-56 infra and accompany-
ing text.
142. See United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Chiarella, 214 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902 (1954); Oxman v. United States,
148 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d
756, 758 (6th Cir. 1942).
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validly imposed and partially served sentence constitutes multiple pun-
ishment. If, however, the sentence initially imposed is not valid, such
as when the court sentences the defendant to less than the minimum
term required by statute, the defendant has not suffered lawful punish-
ment and an appellate court may correct the invalid sentence by in-
creasing the punishment.1 43 Under such circumstances, the increase
does not violate the rule against multiple punishment. 144
B. The Multple Punishment Doctrine's Restrictions on Congress.
The multiple punishment restrictions discussed thus far operate
primarily as restraints on the actions of courts and prosecutors. 145 Con-
gress remains free to define separate crimes and to fix punishments for
a defendant's behavior during a single act or transaction.t 46 The pro-
tection against increases of a validly imposed sentence mandates only
that once a defendant has received punishment authorized by Con-
gress, the courts cannot increase it. As long as Congress acts within its
power to establish crimes and fix punishments, it does not violate the
principles of the multiple punishment doctrine.147
Congressional action could conceivably contravene the third as-
pect of the doctrine by authorizing or directing courts or prosecutors to
increase a sentence after the sentencing procedure for the defendant
has been concluded. In contrast, congressional authorization of double
punishment would not violate the first prohibition of the multiple pun-
ishment doctrine.' 48 If Congress intended to define certain acts as con-
stituting more than one crime, or to punish repeated acts as repeated
violations of a statute, congressional intent would prevail over double
jeopardy concerns. Thus, with respect to appellate review of sentences,
143. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166, 167 n.2 (1947); Murphy v. Massachusetts,
177 U.S. 155, 157 (1900); United States ex rel. Ferrari v. Henderson, 474 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Solomon, 468 F.2d 848, 852 n.8 (7th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 986
(1973); United States v. Evans, 459 F.2d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
144. See cases cited in note 143 supra.
145. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1977); Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's
Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374, 391-93, 280 N.W.2d 793, 796-97 (1979). As the Court stated in
Brown, "once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the
same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure the punishment in more than
one trial." 432 U.S. at 165.
146. See notes 132-38 supra and accompanying text.
147. See cases cited in note 145 supra. The Brown Court stated: "The legislature remains free
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments. ... 432 U.S. at 165.
148. For an argument that Congress has the power to punish an individual twice for the same
offense, notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause, see Note, supra note 2, at 302-04. The author
contended that "double jeopardy's prohibition of multiple punishment would be absurd as a sub-
stantive limitation on the legislature," and concluded that "increasing penalties is clearly within
the power of the legislature." Id. 302.
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the only question is whether Congress violated the third protection of
the multiple punishment doctrine by authorizing the appellate courts to
increase a validly imposed sentence.' 49
C. The Constitutionality of Appellate Review of Sentences.
1. The DiFrancesco Court's Discussion. The DiFrancesco court
discussed various cases purportedly supporting its conclusion that in-
creasing sentences during appellate review constitutes multiple punish-
ment.150 Although these cases do contain dicta to that effect, they
confront only the usual restrictions on the courts after a valid sentence
has been imposed and the sentencing process has been completed.'-5
The DiFrancesco court did not consider whether congressionally au-
thorized review of sentences should be treated as a part of the initial
sentencing process. If sentencing by the trial court and review by the
appellate court are treated as a single congressionally mandated sen-
tencing process, the increased sentence problem does not arise because
there is no final sentence until the entire process is complete.
The dictum cited most often to prohibit increases in sentences is
from United States v. Benz.15 2 In Benz the Court faced the question
whether a district judge has the power, upon petition by a defendant, to
reduce the defendant's sentence. The Court noted the then-prevailing
general rule that judgments, decrees, and orders could be amended,
modified, or vacated by the court that made them, provided the punish-
ment was not augmented.' 53 The Court held that because the district
court had decreased the sentence, it had acted within its power. The
Court argued that "to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to
double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution .. ."154 The Benz dictum does not
pertain to DiFrancesco, because Benz dealt with the problem of a trial
judge exceeding his statutory authority, not with whether increases in
sentences authorized by Congress are unconstitutional.
149. At least one federal court of appeals has concluded that the risk of multiple punishment
does not arise until after the first sentence has been entirely served; thus, an increase in a sentence
still being served would not be considered multiple punishment. Robinson v. Warden, Md. House
of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176 (4th Cir. 1972). The same view is expressed in Dunsky, The
Constitutionality of Increasing Sentence in Appellate Review, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19
(1978).
150. 604 F.2d at 784-85.
151. See note 149 supra and notes 167-70 infra and accompanying text.
152. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
153. Id. at 306-07.
154. Id. at 307.
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The inapplicability of the Benz dictum to DiFrancesco is further
demonstrated by Ex Parte Lange,'-' cited in Benz as supporting au-
thority. In Lange the defendant had been convicted of violating a stat-
ute which prescribed a penalty of either imprisonment or a fine; the
court inadvertently imposed both. After Lange had paid his fine, he
sought discharge from prison. The court vacated the original sentence
and sentenced Lange to prison. The Supreme Court held that because
Lange had been penalized by a fine, one of the alternative penalties
prescribed by the statute, the double jeopardy clause protected him
from being punished again by the subsequent imposition of a prison
sentence. Like Benz, however, Lange presented the double jeopardy
issue in the co$ntext of a trial judge who exceeded his statutory author-
ity by imposing a sentence contrary to Congress's specifications.
Neither case considered whether Congress could provide for the proce-
dures described if it so desired.' 56
The DiFrancesco court is not the only court to misapply Benz to
appellate review of sentences. The confusion regarding the relation of
the double jeopardy clause to appellate court review of sentences is also
exemplified by Walsh v. Picard.57 In Walsh the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld appellate issuance of a longer sentence to a
defendant under a Massachusetts statute that allowed a defendant to
appeal his sentence on the condition that the state have a right to cross
appeal. The court mentioned in dictum, however, that permitting the
state to appeal the sentence on its own initiative "would of course vio-
late the proscription against double jeopardy."' 158 The court relied pri-
marily on the dictum in Benz to reach this conclusion.'5 9
The Walsh court did not consider whether the state legislature had
the power to expand the sentencing function of the courts to include
155. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
156. See Robinson v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176 (4th Cir. 1972).
157. 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971).
158. Id. at 1211. Commentators have also argued that appellate review of sentencing violates
the guarantee against double jeopardy. E.g., Spence, The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of
1977 and Prosecutorial Appeal of Sentences: Justice or Double Jeopardy?, 37 MD. L. REv. 739
(1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy: ProsecutorialAppeals ofSentences, 63 VA. L. REV. 325 (1977).
These commentators, however, have not addressed the issue whether Congress has the power to
expand the sentencing process to include appellate review of sentences. See notes 167-83 infra and
accompanying text. They have based their conclusion that appellate review of sentences consti-
tutes multiple punishment on the purported hostility of the double jeopardy clause to government
appeals, and the traditional limitations on courts and prosecutors when Congress vests the sen-
tencing function exclusively in the trial courts. See Spence, supra, at 774-78; Note, stpra, at 334-
37, 346-47.
159. 446 F.2d at 1211. But Gf Robinson v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172,
1175-76 (4th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the dictum in Benz that a sentence partially served cannot be
increased).
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appellate review of sentences on government appeal. Instead, the court
applied the test used in North Carolina v. Pearce,160 in which the
Supreme Court held that under reasonable circumstances a state may
condition a defendant's right to appeal a conviction on his being sub-
ject to a retrial if the appeal succeeds.161
The problem with the analysis in Walsh is that the court did not
apply the correct double jeopardy test-whether the appellate court
would be increasing a validly imposed sentence.' 62 The Pearce test de-
termines whether an increase of a sentence on retrial violates the four-
teenth amendment due process clause.' 63 Under this test, the Walsh
court simply had to establish that the defendant would be given credit
for time already served once it concluded that appellate review of
sentences on a defendant's appeal was constitutional. In reference to
the double jeopardy clause, the Pearce court simply stated:
We hold that the constitutional guarantee against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment al-
ready exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a
new conviction for the same offense .... Long-established consti-
tutional doctrine makes clear that, beyond [this requirement], the
guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon re-
conviction. 64
The Walsh court's improper determination in dictum that the appellate
160. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
161. Id. at 724-29. The Walsh court supported its determination of reasonableness by arguing
that trial courts in doubt about the appropriate sentence might otherwise impose long sentences
with knowledge that such sentences could be reduced but that sentences that were too short could
not be increased. The court also argued that reducing untoward disparities in sentences would
improve prison morale. 446 F.2d at 1212. Similarly, the Pearce Court found that a retrial serves
the defendant's rights as well as the interests of society. The Court doubted that appellate courts
would be as zealous in protecting defendant's rights if reversal of a conviction would put the
accused beyond the reach of further prosecution. 395 U.S. at 721 n.18 (citing United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
162. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
163. 395 U.S. at 723-25. The court cannot penalize a defendant by imposing a harsher sen-
tence after retrial merely because the individual exercised his right to appeal his conviction. To
ensure that the judge has not acted vindictively, he must state his reasons for lengthening the
punishment in writing. Id. Similarly, the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Statutes re-
quire that the court of appeals state in writing the reasons for its action on review of a sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
In Robinson v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972), the court
held that the Maryland Sentence Review Statute, MD. ANN. CODe art. 26, § 132 (1973), which
permitted the appellate court to increase the sentence if the defendant sought review, satisfied due
process because sentences imposed on appeal were not excessive compared to trial court sentences
for the same offense; because there was not a pattern of increased sentences which would discour-
age individuals from seeking relief; and because the statute required that the defendant be notified
that the review panel could alter sentences because they were too short as well as too long. 455
F.2d at 1176.
164. 395 U.S. at 718-19.
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review of sentences could not be initiated by the government relied
partly on Benz for authority that increases in sentences offend the
double jeopardy clause. The First Circuit also misperceived the legisla-
ture's role in the sentencing process; that misperception is indicated by
the court's discussion of the statute in question. Under that statute, the
court claimed that the defendant would be choosing to "open up the
issue."' t65 Actually, the sentencing process is not "closed" until the leg-
islature intends it to be.166 Under the Massachusetts statute, a defend-
ant challenging his sentence is not reopening the sentencing process
but, rather, is making use of the means that the legislature had pro-
vided for appellate court review. Similarly, legislative definition of the
sentencing process determines whether the government is allowed to
cross-appeal; this determination is not contingent for double jeopardy
purposes on the right of the defendant to appeal. The Massachusetts
legislature determined that the finality of the sentence imposed by the
trial judge was subject to the defendant's seeking review and the gov-
ernment's cross-appealing. If the court of appeals had analyzed the
statute in this manner, it would have been more difficult to conclude
that government-initiated review violates the double jeopardy clause,
because such review could also be perceived as included within the leg-
islature's definition of the sentencing process.
2. Congressional Power to Expand the Sentencing Process to In-
clude Appellate Review. The sentencing function traditionally has been
vested exclusively in the federal trial courts. 167 It is well established
that the appellate court has no control over a sentence that is within the
limits prescribed by a statute.' 68 The Supreme Court has stated in dic-
tum, however, the Congress's tradition of vesting the sentencing func-
tion exclusively in the trial court is subject to congressional amendment
permitting appellate review.' 69 This power to provide for appellate re-
view of sentences is based on Congress's power to fix punishment. 170 In
165. 446 F.2d at 121 .
166. See notes 167-70 infra and accompanying text.
167. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1974). The Court quoted Judge (now
Chief Judge) Kaufman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "At present the United
States is the only nation in the free world where one judge can determine conclusively, decisively
and finally the minimum period of time a defendant must remain in prison, without being subject
to any review of his determination." 418 U.S. at 441 n.14 (quoting Symposium, Appellate Review
ofSentences, 32 F.R.D. 257, 260-61 (1962)).
168. 418 U.S. at 440-41 (quoting Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930)).
See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Townsend v. Bruke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948);
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
169. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 442-44 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932); Gurera v. United States,
40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930).
170. See cases cited in note 169 supra.
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Blockburger v. United States'71 the Supreme Court indicated that Con-
gress has the power to establish crimes and fix punishments, and that
by exercising this power, Congress may limit the discretion of the sen-
tencing courts. The Court found that several successive sales of narcot-
ics constituted distinct offenses. It determined that multiple sentences
did not violate the double jeopardy clause here, for each offense which
constituted a separate violation of the statute was subject to the pre-
scribed penalty.' 72 Concerning the severity of the punishment, the
Court stated: "The plain meaning of the provision is that each offense
is subject to the penalty prescribed; and, if that be too harsh, the rem-
edy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation
under the guise of construction."'' 73
A quarter-century later, in Gore v. United States,174 the Court
stated for the first time that the propriety of appellate review of
sentences is a question of legislative intent. The Gore Court held that it
is not multiple punishment for a defendant to be convicted of three
distinct narcotic violations committed in a single transaction. After
holding that under the Blockburger test the offenses were not single and
identical, the Court discussed the severity of the sentences the trial
judge had imposed, stating:
In effect, we are asked to enter the domain of penology, and more
particularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of
punishment. Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity
of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, ...
these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy. Equally so are the
much mooted problems relating to the power of the judiciary to review
sentences. First the English and then the Scottish Courts of Criminal
Appeal were given power to revise sentences, the power to increase
as well as the power to reduce them. . . This Court has no such
power.175
Because the Gore Court confronted the double jeopardy issue of multi-
ple punishment, recognizing in dictum that the propriety of appellate
review of sentences was a question of legislative policy and that En-
gland and Scotland permitted increase- of sentences on appeal, it is rea-
sonable to expect that the Court would have mentioned any double
jeopardy limitations that would arise if Congress decided to permit ap-
171. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
172. Id. at 304-05. The Court established the Blockburger test to determine whether two of-
fenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment. See
notes 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
173. 284 U.S. at 305. The trial judge had imposed the full penalty of fine and imprisonment
upon each count.
174. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
175. Id. at 393 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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pellate review of sentences. The dictum in Gore strongly implies that
the question of increasing sentences on appeal is one for Congress to
answer.
The ability of Congress to authorize appellate review of sentences
is referred to repeatedly in Dorszynski v. United States. 76 In Dorszyn-
ski the Supreme Court dealt with the Youth Correction Act, 77 ad-
dressing whether Congress intended to limit the trial court's sentencing
discretion by subjecting sentences to appellate review. Although the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend to provide for appellate
review, the Court's opinion left the clear impression that if Congress
had desired, it could have done so. The Dorszynski Court stated:
The "no benefit" finding required by the Act is not to be read as a
substantive standard which must be satisfied to support a sentence
outside the Act, for such a reading would subject the sentence to ap-
pellate review even though the sentence was permitted by the Act's
term, thereby limiting the sentencing court's discretion. We will not
assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-estab-
lished doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it. As our review
has shown, the exclusive sentencing power of district judges was ac-
knowledged, and Congress' intention to affirm that power was clearly
indicated. 178
The apparent invitation to Congress to depart from the usual practice
through some clear expression of intent implies that Congress could
provide for appellate review of an otherwise valid sentence.
The Dorszynski Court quoted Gurera v. United States 79 as author-
ity for the "firmly established [rule] that the appellate court has no con-
trol over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute."
The Gurera case also gives significant insight into the limitations on
appellate review of sentences. Gurera arose from a violation of the
Jones Act, 180 which increased penalties for violating prohibition law.
The court considered the power of Congress to provide for appellate
review:
176. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005, 5010(b)-(d) (1976).
178. 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1974) (emphasis added). The Court relied partly on the legislative
history of the Youth Corrections Act, which affirms Congress's intention to preserve the exclusive
sentencing power of district judges. 418 U.S. at 436-41. The legislative history of the Dangerous
Special Offender Sentencing Statutes, however, clearly demonstrates that Congress meant to de-
part from the doctrine of vesting the exclusive sentencing power in the district judge, and to pro-
vide for appellate review that limits trial judges' discretion. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 93-98 (1969).
179. 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930).
180. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 473, 45 Stat. 1446 (repealed 1935).
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If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly
established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sen-
tence which is within the limits allowed by a statute. If Congress had
intended to change that rule in regard to violations of the liquor
laws, we would have expected a very clear and definite expression of
that intent and a workable expression of the rules which should
guide the trial courts in assessing punishments and the appellate
courts in reviewing such assessments. 181
Thus, Gurera also indicates that although the appellate courts as a gen-
eral rule have no control over the sentences imposed by lower courts,
Congress established the rule and has the power to change it. Neither
Dorszynski nor Gurera held that the double jeopardy clause limits con-
gressional provision for appellate review of sentences.
Expanding the sentencing process to include review by appellate
courts would not impose multiple punishment by increasing validly im-
posed sentences. Until the sentencing procedure established by Con-
gress has been completed, a valid sentence has not been imposed and
multiple punishment is not possible. Under past practice the sentenc-
ing discretion rested entirely with the trial judge, and the procedure
was complete when the judge pronounced sentence. The sole differ-
ence under an appellate review statute is that the sentencing process
includes an additional step.
Gore, Gurera, and Dorszynski support this conclusion by sug-
gesting that Congress may expand the sentencing process to include
appellate review of sentences. This congressional power stems from the
authority to fix punishment for federal crimes.' 82 This authority in-
cludes the power to establish the sentencing procedure in the courts.
Although sentence review in an appellate court under the Dangeous
Special Offender Sentencing Statutes 8 3 subjects a defendant to a possi-
ble increase in punishment, the increase does not constitute "punish-
ment twice, or an attempt to punish twice, for the same offense,"
because the determination of punishment has not been completed
before the sentence has been reviewed.
181. 40 F.2d at 340-41.
182. Even though Congress removed all statutory restrictions to appeals in 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976), Congress would have to explicitly authorize appellate court review of sentences, under its
power to fix the punishment and sentencing process for individuals convicted of crimes, to over-
come the rule that the sentencing function vests exclusively in the trial judge. See note 178 supra
and accompanying text. Congress made the explicit authorization in 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976). See
notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.




The double jeopardy clause protects individuals from multiple
punishment and from multiple prosecutions. Prior to the passage of the
Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Statutes, cases considering the
constitutionality of government appeals focused exclusively on the
double jeopardy protection from multiple prosecutions-a combination
of the protection from a second prosecution for the same offense after
an acquittal and the protection from a second prosecution after a con-
viction. These cases established that government appeals do not offend
the double jeopardy clause unless the defendant is subjected to multi-
ple prosecutions. As appellate review of a sentence does not expose the
defendant to the threat of a second prosecution, it clearly does not of-
fend the double jeopardy clause's protection from multiple prosecu-
tions.
To determine if the government's appeal of the sentence violates
the multiple punishment doctrine, a court must consider whether the
legislature has provided that the appeal in question is a part of the
sentencing process. Congress has the authority to define crimes and to
fix punishments. Traditionally, Congress has vested the sentencing
function exclusively in the trial courts. In fixing the punishment for
dangerous special offenders, however, Congress intentionally and ex-
pressly departed from this tradition and expanded the sentencing proc-
ess to include appellate review, thereby limiting the trial court's
discretion. When an appellate court reviews the sentence imposed by a
trial court, determines that the sentencing court abused its discretion,
and accordingly increases an otherwise valid sentence, the appellate
court does not violate the rule against multiple punishment. The re-
view by the appellate court occurs during the original sentencing proc-
ess, as defined by Congress. Moreover, the appeal ensures that the
punishment Congress intended to impose upon an individual convicted
of a crime is in fact imposed upon him. A defendant has not been
punished a second time, in violation of the double jeopardy clause, un-
til his first punishment is fixed. For dangerous special offenders, the
first punishment is not fixed in the trial court if one of the parties re-
quests appellate review. Hence the expansion of the sentencing func-
tion by Congress to include appellate courts does not constitute
multiple punishment.
[Vol. 1980:847
Vol. 1980:847] APPEAL OF SENTENCES 877
In regard to appellate review of sentences, the multiple punish-
ment protection does not focus on the courts and the prosecutors but
upon Congress itself. Congress's expansion of the sentencing process to
include appellate review of sentences, empowering the appellate courts
to increase or decrease sentences, is a question of legislative policy.
The expansion of the sentencing function does not offend the double
jeopardy clause's prohibition of multiple punishment; congressionally
authorized government appeals therefore are entirely proper.
Ted B. Edwards

